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ABSTRACT 
This thesis explores the human factors effects pilots have when controlling the 
aircraft during the takeoff phase of flight.  These variables come into play in the 
transitory phase from ground roll to flight, and in the initiation of procedures to abort a 
takeoff during the ground run.  The FAA provides regulations for manufacturers and 
operators to follow, ensuring safe manufacture of aircraft and pilots that fly without 
endangering the passengers; however, details regarding accounting of piloting variability 
are lacking.  Creation of a numerical simulation allowed for the controlled variation of 
isolated piloting procedures in order to evaluate effects on field performance.  Reduced 
rotation rates and delayed reaction times were found to cause significant increases in field 
length requirements over values published in the AFM.  A pilot survey was conducted to 
evaluate common practices for line pilots in the field, which revealed minimum 
regulatory compliance is exercised with little to no feedback on runway length 
requirements.  Finally, observation of pilots training in a CRJ-200 FTD gathered 
extensive information on typical piloting timings in the cockpit.  AEO and OEI takeoffs 
were observed, as well as RTOs.  Pilots showed large variability in procedures and 
timings resulting in significant inconsistency in runway distances used as well as V-speed 
compliance.  The observed effects from pilot timing latency correlated with the numerical 
simulation increased field length outputs.  Variability in piloting procedures results in 
erratic field performance that deviates from AFM published values that invite disaster in 
an aircraft operating near its field performance limitations.   
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NOMENCLATURE 
AEO =All Engines Operating 
AGL =Above Ground Level 
ASDA =Accel-Stop Distance Available 
C.F.R. = Code of Federal Regulations 
FTD =Flight Training Device 
KIAS =Knots Indicated Airspeed 
OEI =One Engine Inoperative 
PF =Pilot Flying 
PFD =Primary Flight Display 
PM =Pilot Monitoring 
QRH =Quick Reference Handbook 
RTO =Rejected Takeoff 
TODA =Takeoff Distance Available (beginning of roll to 35ft obstacle at 
end of runway) 
TODR =Takeoff Distance Run 
TOGA =Takeoff / Go Around 
TOGR =Takeoff Ground Roll 
TORA =Takeoff Run Available 
VEF =Speed at which the critical engine is assumed to fail 
Vs, Vs0, Vs1, Vsr =Stall Speed (as called out in various parts of the C.F.R.) 
V1 = Takeoff Go/No-Go Decision Speed (one-engine inoperative) 
V2 = Takeoff Obstacle Clearance Speed (one-engine inoperative) 
ix 
V2MIN =Minimum Climb Out Speed (113% Vs) 
VEF =Engine Failure Airspeed 
VLOF =Liftoff Airspeed 
VMCA =Minimum Controllable Airspeed (takeoff flap setting) (one-engine 
inoperative) 
VMCG =Minimum Controllable Airspeed (on the ground, during the takeoff 
run) 
VMU =Minimum Unstick Airspeed 
VR =Rotation Speed
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I. Introduction 
Within commercial aviation, aircraft field performance is inexorably linked to the 
requirements in the C.F.R.  The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), operating under 
the U.S. Department of Transportation, regulates commercial aviation in the United 
States.  Air carriers and aircraft that conduct operations in the commercial aviation 
industry are bound to these regulations; they have the same effect as law.  Operators or 
manufacturers not in regulatory compliance are subject to significant fines and 
punishments. 
The regulations published by the FAA require manufacturers and operators to 
guarantee compliance with minimum performance targets to ensure safe flight.  Standards 
provided in 14 C.F.R. § 23 and 14 C.F.R. § 25 give manufacturers minimum performance 
targets that their aircraft must achieve by design.  After aircraft leave the production 
floor, 14 C.F.R. § 91, 121, and 135 offer operational standards for flight crews to follow 
in day-to-day operations these ensure safety through procedural compliance.  
FAA regulations act to ensure that aircraft remain within their aerodynamic and 
structural limits; compliance with these rules ensure that operators do not place undue 
risk on their equipment, crew, passengers and cargo.  More essential to the topic 
discussed in this thesis, FAA takeoff requirements mandate that aircraft must not operate 
off a runway that is shorter than the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) would predict for the 
conditions at the time of departure.  This forces aircrews and/or operations to calculate 
the field length requirements prior to attempting takeoff.   
One of the challenges when determining aircraft field performance and 
requirements is understanding the pilot-aircraft interface.  Pilot technique during takeoff 
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is a vital component in aircraft field performance.  Takeoff begins with the aircraft at a 
standing start.  It accelerates through a ground run.  Once sufficient airspeed is achieved, 
the pilot pitches the aircraft on its main wheels to establish a positive angle of attack on 
the wing.  As the pitch angle increases, the wings generate sufficient lift to overcome 
weight, the aircraft achieves flight and climbs away.   
Evaluation of the takeoff ground run, flight transition and flight phase is required 
in order to predict how an airframe will perform in these regimes.  Ultimately, the pilot is 
in direct control of the aircraft and initiates all maneuvers.  Therefore, depending on the 
pilot’s ability to fly the aircraft in the manner consistent with the predictive model, the 
real world performance figures can significantly deviate from numerical predictions.   
Numerical simulations calibrated to flight test results provide the basis for field 
performance estimates presented in an FAA approved AFM.  Typical field performance 
estimation tools assume consistent and accurate pilot techniques in order to achieve the 
predicted field performance.  This brings into question the effects on field performance 
from human factors in the takeoff regime. 
The ground roll portion of the takeoff is consistently predictable in that the 
dominant factors acting on the aircraft are the acceleration and drag forces.  Wind is also 
a factor that influences the takeoff distances, however, the scope of this research follows 
the FAA takeoff regulations that are founded in still air conditions.   
The human element begins to enter the equation at a point where pilot 
intervention is required.  This can be in a rejected takeoff scenario where an emergency 
occurs at a relatively low speed and the pilot elects to abort the takeoff by bringing the 
aircraft to a stop on the runway.  The pilot’s reaction to alarm signals and determination 
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of whether or not the aircraft has surpassed the decision speed (V1) can add significant 
time intervals between recognition and action of application of braking, all while the 
aircraft is still traveling down the runway at speed.   
Application of human factors in a continued takeoff scenario can also lead to 
unforeseen variability in the field length requirements.  Upon achieving flight speed, the 
pilot commands the aircraft to rotate nose-up in order to achieve flight.  The pilot directly 
controls the pitch angle and pitch rate during rotation.  Variation in procedure can add 
significant length to takeoff distances.  Without accounting for the variability introduced 
by piloting techniques, an accurate prediction of real-world field length utilization 
becomes elusive. 
This research seeks to determine how pilots typically operate aircraft in 
commercial operations during the takeoff through observations in a high fidelity, 
commercial aircraft simulator.   
From these studies, a statistical model of reaction times can be used to correlate 
actual runway performance from the nominal pro-forma distances found in an AFM.  
This gives an objective view of where runway usage deviates from predictions and what 
the probable causes may be. 
II. Regulatory Background  
The early days of commercial aviation saw little regulation or attention to safety.  
Manufacturers were not required to build aircraft to meet any performance or safety 
standards.  Operators were not required to perform any rigorous flight planning.  Federal 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) did not exist until 1936, more than 20 years after the first 
commercial flight took off ([IATA], 2017).  Through the years, government regulation 
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began to impose rules and standards on the industry that raised the bar for safety and 
reliability. 
In 1914, Percival Fansler, along with other investors, commissioned two flying 
boats to cross the bay from Tampa to St. Petersburg, FL, which was to become the first 
commercial air service ([IATA], 2017).  The carrier only operated for a few months 
before a mishap resulted in waning interest that resulted in the business folding.  This was 
a common turn of events in the early days of commercial aviation.  
Lack of any safety standardization and performance requirements often resulted in 
planes that were awkward or hazardous to fly that put the passengers on board in serious 
risk.  This was usually discovered only after an incident or mishap that often resulted in 
casualties.   
Interestingly, the U.S. government entered commercial aviation not as a 
regulatory body, but as a financial backer.  In 1918, the U.S. Post Office, with the support 
of the Federal government, began a venture of using aircraft as a means for transporting 
mail (Lawrence, 2014).  Initially, this service was very haphazard and resulted in mail 
and many pilots being lost.   
In 1925, Congress passed the Air Mail Act, which allowed the Post Office to deal 
with private contractors in the carriage of mail (Air Mail Act, 1925).  This boosted 
commercial aviation, however, the Air Mail Act had no regulatory language in it that 
required or enforced any safety standardization or compliance.   
Just one year later, in 1926, the Air Commerce Act was passed (Air Commerce 
Act, 1926).  This act marked a turning point between aviation and the Federal 
government, as it was charged with the creation and adoption of rules and regulations that 
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promoted safety in the manufacture and operation of aircraft.  From this point on, the 
Federal government actively participated in regulating aviation.  The rules and 
regulations that were created through the Air Commerce Act were rudimentary and a first 
step in aviation regulation.   
In 1938, the Civil Aeronautics Act was passed, which offered a more 
comprehensive and complete set of rules and regulations (Civil Commerce Act, 1938).  
The passage of this Act along with the Federal Register Act was what created the C.F.R. 
that exists today (Federal Register Act, 1935).  Title 14 of the C.F.R. is the aeronautics 
portion of the code, where all of the manufacturing, performance and operational 
regulations are under.   
This early C.F.R. contained several requirements that would be recognizable 
today in the modern regulations such as, pilot certificate requirements, aircraft inspection 
and maintenance, air traffic rules and aircraft airworthiness (Code of Federal Regulations, 
1938).   
Most notably, are the regulations contained in 14 C.F.R. § 61, which contained 
the Civil Airline Rules.  These rules go beyond the general aviation rules in keeping with 
a heightened duty of care to the passengers that ride on commercially operated aircraft.  
Some of the detailed requirements are as follows: 
 Limitations on the pilot duty hours and mandates for an appropriate rest 
period (Flight Time Limitations, 1938) 
 If an engine fails on a multi engine aircraft, the aircraft must be able to 
maintain an altitude of at least 1000ft until it can make it to an appropriate 
airport to land (Day Operation Over Water (Multi-engine), 1938) 
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 Weather Bureau reports must be used for flight planning (Weather, 1938) 
 Dispatch must not release an aircraft is weather at the intended destination 
falls below minimums (Weather Minimums, 1938) 
 Dispatch must estimate aircraft takeoff weights using a prescribed “load 
manifest form” (Clearence and Load Manifest Forms, 1938) 
 Reserve fuel requirements for both visual and instrument flight rules flight 
plans (Adequate Fuel Supply, 1938) 
The 1938 C.F.R. resembles the modern day C.F.R. that governs flight operations, 
however, holes still exist.  No runway requirements or One Engine Inoperative (OEI) 
climb performance exists.  
In 1940, the C.F.R. was amended into what more resembles its modern form.  
These regulations addressed, in more detail, takeoff performance requirements for 
aircraft, as well as OEI climb performance.  Detailed requirements are found below: 
 Takeoff at Sea Level must be performed within 1000ft (Takeoff, 1940) 
 Eight times the measured clean stalling speed, or 300ft/min, whichever is 
greater (Climb, 1940) 
 Aircraft must show climb performance with an engine out at appropriate 
flight weights as necessary, as deemed appropriate by the administrator 
(One Engine Inoperative, 1940) 
In these early versions of the C.F.R., general aviation aircraft and commercial transport 
aircraft were all regulated under the same C.F.R. sections.  Unless explicitly identified, 
any requirements that general aviation operators followed were the same for commercial 
operators.   
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In the 1940 supplemental C.F.R., “Transport Category” aircraft did receive a 
more stringent takeoff requirement.  This requirement stated the takeoff distance required 
would the greater of:  
(1) the sum of the distance from a standing start to the indicated airspeed which 
ensures full control with the critical engine-inoperative and the distance required 
to bring the aircraft to a full stop, or (2) the sum of the distance from a standing 
start to the indicated airspeed which ensures full control with the critical engine-
inoperative, as well as the distance required to attain an altitude of at least 50 feet 
above the takeoff surface at a speed no less than 110% the power-off stall speed at 
a steady climb rate specified in § 04.75(a). (Takeoff, 1940) 
In this regulation, the ancestral definition of minimum control airspeed on the ground 
(VMCG) and minimum control airspeed while airborne (VMCA) can clearly be seen.  
The more modern “V-speeds” were introduced in in the 1945 C.F.R. supplement 
(Performance, 1945).   
The requirement to demonstrate take-off runway performance in both normal and 
emergency conditions (either an accelerate-stop rejected takeoff or an accelerate-go with 
failed engine) is essentially modern in concept.  The 50% reduction in headwind credit 
for takeoff climb is a form of increased safety margin, as mentioned in 14 C.F.R § 04.760 
(Operating Limitations, 1940).  The fact that these regulations only apply to “transport 
category” aircraft destined for airline service indicates that this is an attempt to define 
though regulation, a “heightened duty of care.” 
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The C.F.R. was amended through the years following implementation until the 
late 1950s, with the advent of the first generation of jet airliners.  These aircraft had very 
differing performance than the propeller driven aircraft that preceded them.  As such, SR-
422 was issued in 1957 as the basis for certification of the first turbojet powered aircraft 
(Federal Aviation Regulations, 2017).  This special order brought about the field length 
requirements that are used today.  14 C.F.R. § 4b SR-422 4T.117 redefined the takeoff 
distance as, “horizontal distance along the take-off path from the start of the take-off to 
the point where the airplane attains a height of 35 feet above the take-off surface (Takeoff 
Distance, 1960).”  It also includes an all-engines operating safety margin, where the 
official takeoff distance can be no shorter than “115 percent of the horizontal distance 
along the take-off path, with all engines operating, from the start of the take-off to the 
point where the airplane attains a height of 35 feet above the take-off surface (Takeoff 
Distance, 1960).” 
This change is significant in that the obstacle clearance height was lowered from 
50ft to 35ft in order to accommodate the new jet airliners climb performance.  The 
turbojet aircraft could reach appropriate climb rates, but had much higher airspeeds.  This 
resulted in a lower overall climb gradient.  Interestingly, instead of holding the aircraft 
manufacturers to the emplaced requirements, the obstacle clearance height, and the climb 
gradient, was lowered.   
In 1965, the modern C.F.R. came into being.  The FAA completely reformed and 
reorganized the aeronautical portion of the regulations.  Most of Part 4b was incorporated 
into 14 C.F.R. § 25, while SR-422 and Parts 40 and 41 were combined into 14 C.F.R. § 
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121 (Aeronautics and Space, 1965).  Since then this, C.F.R. has remain largely 
unchanged with the only occasional addition of small amendments.   
III. Modern Commercial Regulations 
The reason why this work is important is that existing Federal regulations are 
vague.  A fledgling pilot who first encounters the regulations in 14 C.F.R. § 23 & 25 gets 
the impression that these published standards explicitly govern piloting procedures.  An 
engineer responsible for coding a physics-based simulation for takeoff and landing or 
reducing flight test data discovers many ambiguities.  Supporting documentation 
published by the FAA, such as advisory circular AC-25-7 (in various versions published 
throughout the years) offers some clarifications, however, many decision points are left 
open to interpretation. 
Regulations found in 14 C.F.R. § 23 and 14 C.F.R. § 25 provide manufacturers 
with minimum performance standards that aircraft must achieve by design.  These 
standards dictate the physical properties, such as weight limits, minimum climb gradients, 
V-speeds, etc.  For takeoff specific parameters, these regulations are used in the 
calculation of takeoff distances and weight limitations as well as the definitions of takeoff 
distances.  The distances covered by the regulations in the takeoff regime are; 1) the 
ground roll phase, defined as the horizontal distance covered while the aircraft is 
accelerated until flight speed is achieved, and 2) the airborne phase, which is the 
horizontal distance covered after the main wheels leave the runway until 35ft above the 
runway (Dry Runway Takeoff Distance and Takeoff Run, 1998).  Thus, the entire 
certified takeoff distance comprises of more than just the ground roll, but also the initial 
flight phase for near runway obstacle clearance.  The relevant C.F.R.s will be examined 
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in further detail to expand on the intricacies of determining Critical Field Length (CFL) 
requirements. 
A. Takeoff Regulations - Engineering 
The portions of 14 C.F.R. § 23 & 25 that govern takeoff performance for 
commercial transport and commuter aircraft are noticeably similar in language.  Both 
regulatory sections hold very similar standards for takeoff requirements and definitions.  
For the purpose of this paper, observations will only be referenced to 14 C.F.R. § 25 as 
this regulation gives slightly more detailed requirements and standards over those found 
in 14 C.F.R. § 23.  Any compliance or deviation from 14 C.F.R. § 25 is highly likely to 
have similar effects in 14 C.F.R. § 23. 
Below are edited copies of current takeoff regulations pertinent to determining CFL 
in commercial operations: 
- 14 C.F.R. § 25.101 – General 
(h) The procedures … must—  
(1) Be able to be consistently executed in service by crews of average skill;  
(2) Use methods or devices that are safe and reliable; and  
(3) Include allowance for any time delays, in the execution of the procedures that 
may reasonably be expected in service. 
 
[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-38, 41 FR 55466, 
Dec. 20, 1976; Amdt. 25-92, 63 FR 8318, Feb. 18, 1998] (General, 1998) 
- 14 C.F.R. § 25.107 - Takeoff speeds. 
(a) V1 must be established in relation to VEF as follows: 
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(1) VEF is the calibrated airspeed at which the critical engine is assumed to fail. 
VEF must be selected by the applicant, but may not be less than VMCG 
determined under § 25.149(e). 
(2) V1, in terms of calibrated airspeed, is selected by the applicant; however, V1 
may not be less than VEF plus the speed gained with critical engine inoperative 
during the time interval between the instant at which the critical engine is 
failed, and the instant at which the pilot recognizes and reacts to the engine 
failure, as indicated by the pilot's initiation of the first action (e.g., applying 
brakes, reducing thrust, deploying speed brakes) to stop the airplane during 
accelerate-stop tests. 
(b) V2MIN, in terms of calibrated airspeed, may not be less than— 
(1) 1.13 VSR for— 
… 
(i) Turbojet powered airplanes without provisions for obtaining a 
significant reduction in the one-engine-inoperative power-on stall speed; 
… 
(c) V2, in terms of calibrated airspeed, must be selected by the applicant to provide at 
least the gradient of climb required by § 25.121(b) but may not be less than— 
(1) V2MIN; 
(2) VR plus the speed increment attained (in accordance with § 25.111(c)(2)) before 
reaching a height of 35 feet above the takeoff surface; and 
(3) A speed that provides the maneuvering capability specified in § 25.143(h). 
… 
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(e) VR, in terms of calibrated airspeed, must be selected in accordance with the 
conditions of paragraphs (e)(1) through (4) of this section: 
(1) VR may not be less than— 
(i) V1; 
(ii) 105 percent of VMC; 
(iii) The speed (determined in accordance with §25.111(c)(2)) that allows 
reaching V2 before reaching a height of 35 feet above the takeoff 
surface; or 
(iv) A speed that, if the airplane is rotated at its maximum practicable rate, 
will result in a VLOF of not less than — 
(A) 110 percent of VMU in the all-engines-operating condition, and 
105 percent of VMU determined at the thrust-to-weight ratio 
corresponding to the one-engine-inoperative condition; or 
(B) If the VMU attitude is limited by the geometry of the airplane 
(i.e., tail contact with the runway), 108 percent of VMU in the all-
engines-operating condition, and 104 percent of VMU determined 
at the thrust-to-weight ratio corresponding to the one-engine-
inoperative condition. 
… 
(3) It must be shown that the one-engine-inoperative takeoff distance, using a 
rotation speed of 5 knots less than VR established in accordance with 
paragraphs (e)(1) and (2) of this section, does not exceed the corresponding 
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one-engine-inoperative takeoff distance using the established VR. The takeoff 
distances must be determined in accordance with §25.113(a)(1). 
(4) Reasonably expected variations in service from the established takeoff 
procedures for the operation of the airplane (such as over-rotation of the 
airplane and out-of-trim conditions) may not result in unsafe flight 
characteristics or in marked increases in the scheduled takeoff distances 
established in accordance with §25.113(a). 
 
[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-38, 41 FR 55466, 
Dec. 20, 1976; Amdt. 25-42, 43 FR 2320, Jan. 16, 1978; Amdt. 25-92, 63 FR 8318, Feb. 
18, 1998; Amdt. 25-94, 63 FR 8848, Feb. 23, 1998; Amdt. 25-108, 67 FR 70826, Nov. 
26, 2002; Amdt. 25-121, 72 FR 44665, Aug. 8, 2007]  (Takeoff Speeds, 2011) 
- 14 C.F.R. 14 § 25.109 Accelerate-stop distance. 
(a) The accelerate-stop distance on a dry runway is the greater of the following 
distances: 
(1) The sum of the distances necessary to— 
b. Accelerate the airplane from a standing start with all engines 
operating to VEF for takeoff from a dry runway; 
c. Allow the airplane to accelerate from VEF to the highest speed 
reached during the rejected takeoff, assuming the critical engine fails at 
VEF and the pilot takes the first action to reject the takeoff at the V1 for 
takeoff from a dry runway; and 
14 
d. Come to a full stop on a dry runway from the speed reached as 
prescribed in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section; plus 
e. A distance equivalent to 2 seconds at the V1 for takeoff from a dry 
runway. 
(2) The sum of the distances necessary to— 
(i) Accelerate the airplane from a standing start with all engines operating to 
the highest speed reached during the rejected takeoff, assuming the pilot 
takes the first action to reject the takeoff at the V1 for takeoff from a dry 
runway; and 
(ii) With all engines still operating, come to a full stop on dry runway from 
the speed reached as prescribed in paragraph (a)(2)(i) of this section; plus 
(iii) A distance equivalent to 2 seconds at the V1 for takeoff from a dry 
runway. 
… 
(e) Except as provided in paragraph (f)(1) of this section, means other than wheel 
brakes may be used to determine the accelerate-stop distance if that means— 
(1) Is safe and reliable; 
(2) Is used so that consistent results can be expected under normal operating 
conditions; and 
(3) Is such that exceptional skill is not required to control the airplane. 
(f) The effects of available reverse thrust— 
(1) Shall not be included as an additional means of deceleration when determining 
the accelerate-stop distance on a dry runway; and 
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(2) May be included as an additional means of deceleration using recommended 
reverse thrust procedures when determining the accelerate-stop distance on a wet 
runway, provided the requirements of paragraph (e) of this section are met. 
… 
 [Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-42, 43 FR 2321, 
Jan. 16, 1978; Amdt. 25-92, 63 FR 8318, Feb. 18, 1998] (Accelerate-Stop Distance, 
1998) 
- 14 C.F.R. § 25.111 Takeoff path  
(a) The takeoff path extends from a standing start  
 … 
(3) The airplane must be accelerated on the ground to VEF, at which point the 
critical engine must be made inoperative and remain inoperative for the rest of 
the takeoff; and  
(4) After reaching VEF, the airplane must be accelerated to V2.  
(b) During the acceleration to speed V2, the nose gear may be raised off the ground at 
a speed not less than VR. However, landing gear retraction may not be begun 
until the airplane is airborne.  
(c) During the takeoff  
… 
(2) The airplane must reach V2 before it is 35 feet above the takeoff surface and 
must continue at a speed as close as practical to, but not less than V2, until it is 
400 feet above the takeoff surface;  
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[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-6, 30 FR 8468, 
July 2, 1965; Amdt. 25-42, 43 FR 2321, Jan. 16, 1978; Amdt. 25-54, 45 FR 60172, Sept. 
11, 1980; Amdt. 25-72, 55 FR 29774, July 20, 1990; Amdt. 25-94, 63 FR 8848, Feb. 23, 
1998; Amdt. 25-108, 67 FR 70826, Nov. 26, 2002; Amdt. 25-115, 69 FR 40527, July 2, 
2004; Amdt. 25-121, 72 FR 44666; Aug. 8, 2007] (Takeoff Path, 2007) 
 
- 14 C.F.R. § 25.113 Dry runway takeoff distance and takeoff run. 
(a) Takeoff distance on a dry runway is the greater of- 
(1) The horizontal distance along the takeoff path from the start of the takeoff to 
the point at which the airplane is 35 feet above the takeoff surface, determined 
under §25.111 for a dry runway; or 
(2) 115 percent of the horizontal distance along the takeoff path, with all engines 
operating, from the start of the takeoff to the point at which the airplane is 35 
feet above the takeoff surface, as determined by a procedure consistent with 
§25.111.  
… 
(b) If the takeoff distance does not include a clearway, the takeoff run is equal to the 
takeoff distance.  If the takeoff distance includes a clearway- 
(1) The takeoff run on a dry runway is the greater of— 
(i) The horizontal distance along the takeoff path from the start of the takeoff 
to a point equidistant between the point at which VLOF is reached and 
the point at which the airplane is 35 feet above the takeoff surface, as 
determined under §25.111 for a dry runway; or 
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(ii) 115 percent of the horizontal distance along the takeoff path, with all 
engines operating, from the start of the takeoff to a point equidistant 
between the point at which VLOF is reached and the point at which the 
airplane is 35 feet above the takeoff surface, determined by a procedure 
consistent with §25.111. 
 
[Doc. No. 5066, 29 FR 18291, Dec. 24, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 25-23, 35 FR 5671, 
Apr. 8, 1970; Amdt. 25-92, 63 FR 8320, Feb. 18, 1998] (Dry Runway Takeoff Distance 
and Takeoff Run, 1998) 
 
Despite the details covered in the regulations, many ambiguities exist that require 
some form of clarification.  For example, in 2012, the FAA published AC-25-7C, the 
latest revision helping to clarify “Certified Takeoff and Landing Procedures” (Flight Test 
Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes, 2012).  These circulars are not 
legally binding; however, clarification is given on the agency’s standing with regard to 
any ambiguous or vague statements.   
The standards published in these regulations form the design targets engineers use 
to draft aircraft geometries and systems, which provide a starting point for operational 
parameters and procedures published in AFMs.  Once the aircraft is built, the flight 
envelope and other flight characteristics are determined through flight test since the FAA 
holds, “flight test demonstrations are the preferred method to show compliance” (Flight 
Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes, 2012).  Once the FAA 
approves the AFM and certifies the aircraft as “airworthy,” the aircraft should fly “by the 
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book.”  These flight manuals provide reference performance data, based upon models that 
assume that pilots operate aircraft in a specific manner. 
The FAA concedes that, “simulation(s) may be an acceptable alternative to flight 
demonstrations in certain situations” (Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport 
Category Airplanes, 2012). Thus, in practice the data found in an aircraft flight manual 
derive from numerical simulations that are calibrated against flight test demonstrations.  
Therefore, the fidelity of any simulations is dependent upon the quality of aerodynamic 
and propulsive data. 
The spirit of the FAA one-engine-inoperative rules is to assume a catastrophic 
failure of an engine.  In most cases, the manufacturer will flight test one-engine-
inoperative performance data using a “throttle chop” procedure, where the critical engine 
is reduced to idle thrust as a safety measure.  The idle engine can quickly be brought back 
to any thrust setting if so needed.  However, the FAA requires the manufacturer to 
substantiate one-engine-inoperative takeoff and landing performance with “at least a 
limited number of fuel cuts” that render the engine truly inoperable. 
Takeoff procedures used to develop demonstration data should be attainable “in 
service by crews of average skill, using methods or devices that are safe and reliable, and 
include allowances for any time delays in the execution of the procedures that may 
reasonably be expected in service” (Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport 
Category Airplanes, 2012).  The FAA discourages “exceptional piloting techniques … 
from being used to generate unrealistic takeoff distances” (Flight Test Guide for 
Certification of Transport Category Airplanes, 2012).  These guidelines ensure that an 
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aircraft flight manual contains performance values that are “representative of that which 
can reasonably be expected to be achieved in operational service” (Flight Test Guide for 
Certification of Transport Category Airplanes, 2012). 
To summarize, the FAA allows manufacturers to predict AFM field performance 
using numerical simulations calibrated to some flight test data in lieu of a comprehensive 
table of actual test flight outcomes.  These numerical simulations assume consistent and 
precise pilot procedures and techniques in the operation of the aircraft.  In reality, there 
exists variability in the adherence to procedure and execution timings.  The worst-case 
scenarios of deviation stand to add significant distances to the field length requirements 
that may not be considered by the numerical takeoff simulations.  These simulations are 
calibrated to match individual results attained by test pilots who are instructed not to fly 
the aircraft with “average skill.”  In reality, the combination of a substandard pilot and a 
“worn-out” aircraft operating at the limits of the AFM stated performance limits may 
incite disaster.   
Interestingly, from an AFM perspective, aircraft are only required to adhere to the 
design regulations that were in place at the time of their certification.  The aircraft is then 
exempt from any changes that take effect within the regulations (for example a change to 
the minimum V2min speed computation in 14 C.F.R. § 25.107 that went into effect in 
1998).  With many aircraft, still in service today, that originally saw certification 20, 30, 
40 years ago or more, many procedures exist throughout commercial fleets that can vary 
wildly depending on the type of airframes in use.  This procedural variability may exist 
between carriers, or in the case of carriers with large fleets, variation may exist within a 
single carrier. 
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Conversely, commercial operators flying in the Contiguous U.S. must adhere to the 
standards published in the operations regulations, 14 C.F.R. § 91 (Applicability, 2016), 
121 (Appliciability, 2007) and 135 (Applicability, 2014), and change their practices to 
reflect any updates to these regulations. 
B. Takeoff Regulations - Operations 
Regulations found in 14 C.F.R. § 91, 121 and 135 provide air carriers and pilots 
with additional standards that aircraft must abide by during operation.  These C.F.R.’s 
offer less clarity on the specifics of performance targets with the only clearly defined 
requirement being that the aircraft must not operate at an airfield with runway of 
insufficient length.  It would seem that this is a bit redundant, in that no qualified pilot 
would operate an aircraft off a runway that was sure to run out of tarmac before achieving 
flight speed, however, determining field length requirements is far from intuitive.   
The standards published in 14 C.F.R. § 91 form operational requirements for aircrews to 
follow.  These regulations are simplistic.  The only requirement is that the aircraft must 
operate off a runway with enough length to accommodate a rejected takeoff or a 
continued takeoff.  This leaves any procedures required to accomplish this wide open for 
any operator to interpret.  With these regulations, the FAA is essentially telling operators 
that they are indifferent in the methods or procedures used, so long as the aircraft 
operates off runways with sufficient length.  These requirements only apply to the 
transport category aircraft not operating commercially or in any other “for hire” capacity.   
Conversely, the requirements published 14 C.F.R. § 121 and 135 form the 
operational regulations for air carriers that operate in a commercial or a “for hire” 
capacity.   
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Commercial aviation in the U.S. can generally be divided into two categories; (1) 
aircraft operating in a commuter or “on-demand” operation and (2) as a scheduled or 
“flag” operation.  The aircraft flown under commuter category operations are regulated 
by 14 C.F.R. § 135, whereas the aircraft operated under scheduled category operations 
are regulated by 14 C.F.R. § 121 rules.  Commuter aircraft can be quite varied in size and 
performance, with aircraft certified under both 14 C.F.R. § 23 and 25.  Scheduled air 
carriers typically operate regional size turbofan aircraft, or larger, that are certified under 
14 C.F.R. § 25.  Detailed examination of specific regulations will be limited to part 121, 
due to the similarities in the specific regulations between part 121 and 135.  Any 
compliance or deviation from part 121 is highly likely to have similar effects in part 135.   
The operational takeoff regulations for civil transport flag operations in the 
contiguous United States can be found in 14 C.F.R. § 121.1 and 121.189.  Below are 
edited copies of current takeoff regulations: 
- 14 C.F.R. §121.1   Applicability 
This part prescribes rules governing— 
(a) The domestic, flag, and supplemental operations of each person who holds or is 
required to hold an Air Carrier Certificate or Operating Certificate 
[Doc. No. 28154, 60 FR 65925, Dec. 20, 1995, as amended by Amdt. 121-328, 72 FR 6912, 
Feb. 13, 2007; Amdt. 121-336, 72 FR 63411, Nov. 8, 2007] (Appliciability, 2007) 
 
- 14 C.F.R. §121.189   Airplanes: Turbine engine powered: Takeoff limitations. 
… 
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(c)  No person operating a turbine engine powered airplane certificated after August 
29, 1959 (SR422B), may take off that airplane at a weight greater than that listed 
in the Airplane Flight Manual at which compliance with the following may be 
shown: 
(1) The accelerate-stop distance must not exceed the length of the runway plus the 
length of any stopway. 
(2) The takeoff distance must not exceed the length of the runway plus the length 
of any clearway except that the length of any clearway included must not be 
greater than one-half the length of the runway. 
(3) The takeoff run must not be greater than the length of the runway. 
… 
[Doc. No. 6258, 29 FR 19198, Dec. 31, 1964, as amended by Amdt. 121-268, 63 FR 
8321, Feb. 18, 1998] (Airplanes: Turbine Powered: Takeoff, 1998) 
 
Several factors play into the field lengths aircraft need in order to achieve flight, 
or perform a rejected takeoff, with an appropriate factor of safety.  These can include 
mechanical variables, such as variations in weight, thrust, or braking effectiveness, but 
piloting techniques can also have a significant effect on field length requirements.  
Factors such as reaction timing for activating rejected takeoff procedures and rotation 
rates for continued takeoff procedures are all human factors that can introduce substantial 
growth to field length requirements.  
Problems begin to arise in the calculation of critical field length requirements if 
one or more variables cannot be accounted for, which introduces significant error into the 
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predicted field length outputs.  More importantly, no federal standardization exists to 
enforce standardization of procedure in these critical flight regimes.   
A survey of AFMs from 14 C.F.R. §25 certified aircraft, or similar, across a 
variety of manufacturers finds considerable ambiguity in takeoff rotation procedure.  The 
Lockheed C-130J AFM (military spec) specifically states, “Takeoff performance data 
assumes a rotation rate of approximately 3 degrees per second” (Martin, 2011).  
Alternatively the Lockheed C-5A AFM (military spec) states that, “takeoff performance 
charts are based on rotation time, which varies from 3 seconds at light gross weights to 5 
seconds at heavy weights” (Martin, 2012).  The Beechjet 400A AFM recommends a 
rotation target pitch of,“13° to 15° desired” attitude; where performance charts 
specifically call out distances computed following a procedure where the “airplane was 
rotated to an attitude of approximately 14° nose up” (Beechcraft).  No pitch speeds are 
given.  The Hawker 800XP pilot training manual is even more ambiguous, providing 
neither a target pitch attitude, nor target pitch rate for takeoff rotation (Hawker).  The 
DC-10 AFM does not provide a target pitch attitude, but calls out that the manual bases 
distances upon a “rotation time of four seconds” (Douglas).  Alternatively a B737 Classic 
flight crew training manual (FCTM) provides a target pitch attitude (15° nose up) and a 
target pitch rate of 2° to 3°  per second (Flight Crew Training Manual: 737 Classic).  The 
B737-800 FCOM provides a target pitch attitude (15° nose up) but does not suggest a 
pitch rate (Flight Crew Training Manual: 737-800).  Similarly, the DGAC Approved 
Airbus narrow body (A318/319/320/321) flight manual trains pilots to “achieve a normal 
and continuous rotation rate to a pitch attitude of 12.5°” (Airbus).   
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Examination of these flight manuals show little or no accounting for the 
variability in piloting techniques and offered few procedural standards during the takeoff 
phase.  This illuminates the inconsistency in manufacturer evaluation or publication of 
effects on field performance due to varying pilot techniques.  However, this is not 
reflected in all AFM’s as some manufacturers do provide highly detailed takeoff 
procedures.  These procedural inconsistencies in the published AFM’s lead to 
inconsistent aircrew training, as pilots are generally trained with respect to the procedures 
laid out in the AFM.  Highly detailed AFM’s lead to increased pilot training and flight 
crews capable of consistently operating the aircraft very close to predicted field length 
requirements, whereas poorly detailed AFM’s lead to flight crews that have to operate 
with procedures open to interpretation and are full of ambiguity, leading to significant 
deviations in actual runway usage.  While these AFMs provide insight into piloting 
techniques that manufacturers may, or may not, account for to determine field length 
requirements, the standard operating procedures used by airlines were not evaluated. 
IV. Certified Takeoff Procedure 
Airplane operating procedures that are appropriate for determining takeoff 
distance are commonly found in the performance section of the AFM, as required by the 
FAA.  This is where the V speeds are presented along with associated distances required 
to achieve the various speeds.  The FAA requires all commercial aircraft manufacturers 
to determine these speeds through flight-testing or simulation, and the aircraft must 
adhere to these speeds through inherent performance and piloting procedures. 
The minimum control ground speed (VMCG) is the lowest indicated airspeed 
during the takeoff run where the aircraft can maintain directional control with the loss of 
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the critical engine on the runway (Minimum Control Speed, 2015).  Directional control 
must be maintained with the use of rudder alone; no credit for nose wheel steering is 
given.  Interestingly, mil-spec rules that govern military aircraft similar to the way the 
C.F.R.s govern civilian aircraft allow for the use of nose wheel steering in the calculation 
of VMCG, resulting in a lower airspeed ([DOD], 1997). 
The minimum control air speed (VMCA) is the lowest indicated airspeed that the 
aircraft can maintain directional stability with the critical engine failed while airborne 
(Minimum Control Speed, 2015).  This is to be accomplished with just the use of rudder 
and no more than 5° of bank angle.   
The engine failure speed (VEF) is the airspeed at which the critical engine failure 
occurs (Minimum Control Speed, 2015).  This does not take into account sagging thrust 
from engine spool-down.  The designer must choose the VEF speed, which can be 
anywhere from VMCG to VMCA. 
The takeoff decision speed (V1) is the indicated airspeed at which a “go-no-go” 
decision for takeoff continuation is essentially made for the pilot (Takeoff Speeds, 2015).  
During the takeoff run, if the critical engine fails below V1, the takeoff is aborted.  If the 
critical engine fails above V1 the takeoff is continued OEI.  V1 may be selected as low as 
the VEF speed, plus any gains in airspeed attained through two seconds of residual 
acceleration with one engine still functioning at takeoff thrust.  During the Rejected 
Takeoff (RTO), the pilot deploys aerodynamic drag/lift-dump devices and uses the wheel 
brakes to bring the aircraft to a stop.  Reverse thrust credit is not permitted in calculating 
the stop distance after RTO has been initiated.  Within the regulations, the FAA requires 
the accounting of pilot reaction times stating: 
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V1 is determined by adding to VEF (the speed at which the critical engine is 
assumed to fail) the speed gained with the critical engine inoperative during the 
time interval between the instant at which the critical engine is failed and the 
instant at which the test pilot recognizes and reacts to the engine failure, as 
indicated by the pilot’s application of the first retarding means during accelerate-
stop tests (Takeoff Speeds, 2011). 
The determination of V1 includes the time it takes for the pilot to initiate the first 
steps to bring the aircraft to a stop.  The FAA requires a minimum reaction time of one 
second; however, if greater reaction times are shown during test runs or by pilot 
experience, the designer should adjust the reaction times accordingly.   
While the regulations give a defined reaction time, AC-25-7C delves into more 
detail as to what reaction times are reasonable during RTO.  The advisory circular 
suggests a one-second delay for each step a pilot must take to transition from takeoff 
acceleration to all-stop deceleration (Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport 
Category Airplanes, 2012).  Most commercial transport aircraft require three steps for full 
braking configuration, such as aerodynamic braking/lift-dump deployment, throttle retard 
and wheel braking.  This implies that a reasonable reaction timing would be 
approximately three seconds.   
Under the RTO regulations, the designer must also include the distance covered in 
an additional two-second period at V1 in calculating the accelerate-stop distance during a 
RTO (Accelerate-Stop Distance, 1998).  While the FAA acknowledges and mandates 
accounting for human delays, the delays are not accounting for pilot indecision or 
confusion that arises from an emergency.  The time delays are merely reaction times for 
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emergency recognition and the time required to configure the aircraft for maximum effort 
braking.  Expanding further on this, AC-25-7C states:  
The two-second time period is only provided as a method to calculate the required 
distance increment, and is not considered to be a part of the accelerate-stop 
braking transition sequence … no credit for pilot actions, or engine and systems 
transient responses (e.g., engine spin-down) … during this two-second time 
period (Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport Category Airplanes, 
2012).   
 Any benefit of automated systems for braking or other retarding devices that 
decrease the number of pilot actions are no to be reflected in the two second time.   
For the FAA certified RTO procedure, the three reaction timings are: (1) One 
second of acceleration under OEI prior to V1, (2) a two to three second delay at V1 for 
initiating braking action (without using any braking credit), and (3) two seconds at V1 to 
account for the decision making process required to determine if the aircraft is in fact 
experiencing an emergency that requires aborting the takeoff.   
The minimum unstick speed (VMU) is the lowest possible speed an aircraft can 
safely achieve flight (Takeoff Speeds, 2011).  This is usually determined during testing 
by rotating the aircraft onto its tail and accelerating under part power until the wheels just 
leave the ground.   
The rotation speed (VR) is the indicated airspeed that the pilot rotates the aircraft 
on its main wheels to a positive pitch angle (Takeoff Speeds, 2011).  At this airspeed the 
aircraft will achieve flight with enough residual performance to accelerate to V2 just as 
the wheel reach 35ft AGL under OEI.  Under normal AEO operations, the aircraft is 
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expected to overshoot V2.  The FAA gives no regulatory requirement for the rate the 
aircraft is rotated, however, AC-25-7C expands on the expectation, stating: the airplane is 
rotated at its maximum practicable rate” (Flight Test Guide for Certification of Transport 
Category Airplanes, 2012).  The FAA requires that VR be no less than V1, or 105% of 
VMCG, or 105% of VMU (Takeoff Speeds, 2011).   
The lift off speed (VLOF) is the indicated airspeed where the aircraft first 
becomes airborne.  Since the aircraft is still accelerating under takeoff power, in either 
AEO or OEI, it is expected to continue to gain airspeed after VR is achieved and the 
aircraft begins rotation.  This results in VLOF occurring at a higher airspeed than VR.   
The second segment climb speed (V2) is the indicated airspeed the aircraft must 
achieve at 35ft AGL in order to meet the minimum climb gradients.  V2 must be 
achieved in either OEI or AEO cases with takeoff flaps set and the landing gear in the 
down position.  The FAA mandates that V2 may not be lower than 113% of the stall 
speed with the flaps in the takeoff position or 110% of VMCA, whichever is lower 
(Takeoff Speeds, 2015).   
V. Numerical Simulation 
In an effort to understand the relationship between aircraft field performance and 
piloting timings and techniques are related, a numerical simulation was created that 
calculates takeoff distances based on differing procedural timings.  This work was 
previously carried out in AIAA-2017-0007, which evaluated piloting and physical effects 
on aircraft field performance (Takahashi, Wood, & Bays, 2016).  This thesis will only 
cover the pertinent portions of the paper that analyze the takeoff flight regime.   
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A. Takeoff Simulation Description 
For takeoff, the simulation must include modules to ensure that: 
•The “Accelerate-stop distance must not exceed the length of the runway 
plus the length of any stopway” (the accelerate-stop-distance-available 
(ASDA)), and 
•“Takeoff distance must not exceed the length of the runway plus the length 
of any clearway” (the takeoff distance available (TODA))  
• “Takeoff (ground) run must not be greater than the length of the runway.”  
(Takeoff Ground Run (TOGR)) (Airplanes: Turbin Engine Powered: 
Takeoff Limitations, 1998)  
Compliance with these requirements will determine a successful takeoff or RTO 
but are not the regulatory requirements for dispatch determination of field length 
requirements.  Critical Field length (CFL) computation will follow the regulatory 
requirements in 14 C.F.R. § 25.113, which states that the takeoff distance is to be greater 
than:  
the horizontal distance along the takeoff path from the start of the takeoff to the 
point at which the airplane is 35 feet above the takeoff surface … or ... 115 
percent of the horizontal distance along the takeoff path, with all engines 
operating, from the start of the takeoff to the point at which the airplane is 35 feet 
above the takeoff surface (Dry Runway Takeoff Distance and Takeoff Run, 1998) 
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Thus, three inequalities govern field length: 
 
𝐴𝑆𝐷𝐴 > max( 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑂𝐸𝐼 , 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑇𝑂) 
𝑇𝑂𝐷𝐴 > max( 𝑇𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐼 , 1.15 ∙ 𝑇𝑂𝐷𝑅𝐴𝐸𝑂) 
𝑅𝑈𝑁𝑊𝐴𝑌 > max( 𝑇𝑂𝐺𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐼 , 𝑇𝑂𝐺𝑅𝐴𝐸𝑂) 
 
For a conventional runway, where the entire runway is paved (no distinct clearway 
or stopway), critical field length may be defined as: 
 
𝐶𝐹𝐿 =  max( 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑂𝐸𝐼 , 𝐴𝑆𝐷𝑅𝑇𝑂, 𝑇𝑂𝐷𝑅𝑂𝐸𝐼 , 1.15 ∙  𝑇𝑂𝐷𝑅𝐴𝐸𝑂)   
 
 
Figure 1 Schematic of Takeoff Procedure (AEO accel-go v. OEI accel-go v. RTO) 
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Thus, so long as the runway is longer than the estimated critical field length there 
is no chance for a crash or ground based excursion in the event of engine failure during 
takeoff. 
i. Accelerate-Stop Simulation 
The accelerate-stop, or RTO, case is governed by the requirements in 14 C.F.R § 
25.109. The simulation numerically integrates the aircraft time and position history for 
two scenarios: 
 When an engine fails at the most inopportune time (recognized by the pilot 
just as the aircraft reaches V1), the pilot initiates the RTO procedures, and 
 When the pilot decides to abort the takeoff for any reason just as the 
aircraft reaches V1, and initiates RTO with all engines operating 
In scenario 1: following the C.F.R. requirements, the total distance covered by the 
aircraft when it accelerates is calculated: 
 “from a standing start with all engines operating to VEF,”  
 “from VEF to the highest speed reached during the rejected takeoff, 
assuming the critical engine fails at VEF and the pilot takes the first action 
to reject the takeoff at V1”  
 travel “a distance equivalent to 2 seconds at the V1” speed, and 
 “come to a full stop” (Accelerate-Stop Distance, 1998) 
In scenario 2: following the C.F.R. requirements, total distance covered by the 
aircraft when it accelerates is calculated: 
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 “from a standing start with all engines operating to the highest speed 
reached during the rejected takeoff, assuming the pilot takes the first 
action to reject the takeoff at V1,”  
 travel “a distance equivalent to 2 seconds at the V1 ”   speed  
 “with all engines still operating, come to a full stop on dry runway” 
(Accelerate-Stop Distance, 1998) 
Note that braking effect is a function of the weight on wheels.  Because any 
residual lift developed by the wing will reduce the effective weight on wheels, an 
airplane that lifts up at its ground incidence will have a longer stopping distance than one 
that develops downforce.  The residual thrust of the engines(s) at idle also contribute to 
the stopping distance.  Presently, the use of thrust reversers is forbidden by regulation 
when calculating the accelerate-stop distance.  In an actual rejected takeoff situation, if 
reverse thrust is available, pilots will use it to help stop the aircraft quickly. 
ii. Failed Engine Accelerate-Go Simulation 
The OEI accelerate-go case is governed by the requirements in 14 C.F.R § 
25.109.  The simulation numerically integrates the aircraft time and position history to 
simulate:  
 Acceleration “from a standing start with all engines operating to VEF,”  
 From VEF to the V1 “ go-no-go” speed, with one engine failed,  
 From V1 to the VR rotation speed, with one engine failed,  
 With one engine failed, have the pilot command a nose-up attitude until 
the aircraft leaves the runway (where Lift > Weight),  
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 With one engine failed, allow the aircraft to climb until it reaches a height 
of 35ft above the runway surface; VR must be selected so that the aircraft 
has enough residual performance to accelerate to the scheduled V2 speed 
at this point.  (Takeoff Path, 2007) 
iii. All Engines Operating Takeoff Simulation 
The AEO accelerate-go case is governed by the requirements in 14 C.F.R § 
25.113, which reflects normal operating conditions.  The simulation numerically 
integrates the aircraft time and position history to simulate:  
 Accelerating from a standing start with all engines operating to the VR 
rotation speed,  
 Command a nose-up attitude until the aircraft leaves the runway (where 
Lift > Weight), 
 Allow the aircraft to climb until it reaches a height of 35ft above the 
runway surface; the aircraft is allowed to considerably exceed the 
scheduled V2 speed.  (Dry Runway Takeoff Distance and Takeoff Run, 
1998) 
B. Balanced Field vs. Pilot’s Convenience Critical Field Length 
The purpose of determining the field length requirements for accel-go and accel-
stop cases are so that the dispatcher can determine what field length requirement goes 
with a particular decision speed.  Since the dispatcher can select the V1, the field lengths 
can be tailored, so the accel-go and accel-stop distances are identical.  This is known as 
the balanced field case, which represents the shortest runway distance that the aircraft can 
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operate off.  A balanced field case will have an equidistant OEI continued acceleration 
and initial climb out from V1, and an accel-stop distance.   
 
Depending on the runway condition and the aircraft loading, a scenario exists 
where it may be impossible to obtain a balanced field case.  In lightweight or low traction 
runways, the field performance may be accel-stop limited since the aircraft will have 
difficulty stopping.  Since VEF, which controls V1, cannot be lowered past VMCG, the 
accel-stop distance will hit a lower floor that could result in the accel-stop distance 
remaining longer than the OEI or AEO accel-go case.  Conversely, at heavy aircraft 
weights and short runways, the case may arise where the aircraft is accel-go limited.  The 
limiting factor in this case is often the OEI accel-go case, as the aircraft’s ability to 
accelerate is significantly hampered.  This demonstrates the interaction between balanced 
field determination and the coupling with the decision speed.  
In the modern world with exceedingly long runways, a special scenario exists 
where, although a balanced field case can be reached, the dispatcher may elect to raise 
 
Figure 2  Balanced field length terminology chart 
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V1 to an airspeed were it equals VR.  If it can be concluded that the aircraft has enough 
runway to perform a successful RTO at nearly VR, the dispatcher has a unique option to 
make the pilot’s lives a little easier.  In a balanced field scenario, several knots separate 
V1 and VR.  In the case of an engine failure, the pilot is expected to maintain aircraft 
control and continue to accelerate until rotation speed with markedly reduced 
acceleration.  Compound this with a cockpit awash with warning lights and aural 
announcements, and the atmosphere is ripe for an error or mishap to occur.  The startled 
pilot could understandably choose to react instinctively, instead of relying on training and 
acting rationally.  Setting the decision speed to the same airspeed as VR, given enough 
runway length, the decision process is effectively removed and a more straightforward 
process emerges.  If a warning arises below flight speed, the aircraft is brought to a stop; 
if the warning alerts above VR, the aircraft is already flying and the aircrew continues the 
climb out OEI. 
VI. Trade Studies 
The numerical simulation used to evaluate aircraft field performance used a 
common narrow body airframe, similar to an A320.  Various timings in the takeoff 
regime were evaluated.   
OEI accel-go or accel-stop scenarios commonly drive field length requirements.  
The ability of an aircraft to accelerate and come to a stop can greatly affect runway 
usage.  Acceleration during the ground run is easily predicted, and assumed to be well 
correlated with the weight and configuration of the aircraft.  Ambiguity begins to arise 
when the pilots begin to interact with the aircraft in an RTO scenario, or the continuation 
with the takeoff.  In the RTO case, the pilot’s reaction to engine failure, or other 
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indications that warrant an aborted takeoff, can have strong effects on field requirements.  
The reaction times are varied to examine how much horizontal distance is covered at 
differing timings.  The accel-go field requirements are vulnerable to rotation rates once 
VR is achieved.  The rotation rates for AEO and OEI are varied to examine how much 
horizontal distance is covered at differing rates.   
The simulation was calibrated against performance figures given in the A320 
manual.  This was accomplished by making small adjustments in the zero lift drag and 
braking traction coefficients.  Once the simulation aircraft matched the performance 
targets, evaluation of field length requirements was carried out.  Refer to AIAA 2017-
0007 for detailed description on the calibration process.   
 
In Figure 3, the effects of decision speed on balanced field lengths are examined 
with respect to weight. Following 14 C.F.R. § 121, for permissible dispatch, the runway 
must be no longer than the greatest distance as controlled by 14 C.F.R. § 25.113.   In all 
cases studied, the field length increases with higher weights.  By setting the decision 
speed (V1) between VMCG and VR, we can usually obtain a balanced field condition 
 
Figure 3 Comparison of short field v. pilot's convenience decision speed 
schedule (from simulaiton) 
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(where accel-stop equals accel-go). In all cases, the required field length is noticeably 
shorter than that found when V1=VR.  This is to be expected as the balanced field length 
decision speed, V1, is always slower than the rotation speed. 
Table 1 Effect of Variant Condition on Certified Takeoff 
 
Table 1 demonstrates the calculated field length requirements for takeoff across 
varying weights.  At the lightest weight VR is limited to the no less than 1.05*VMCG.  
At all weights above, VR is a function of the aircraft’s ability to achieve V2 under OEI 
conditions.  In this case the V1 speeds are limited at the lighter weights by the VMCG 
floor limit.  At the heavier weights the accel-stop and accel-go constraints factor into 
calculation of V1.  Interestingly, the field length requirements for balanced field V1 and 
pilot’s convenience V1=VR, at the heavy and light weights converge.  This would 
indicate that the accel-go performance is the dominant factor in the V1 calculation, since 
the aircraft is able to stop in nearly the same distances at V1 and VR.  At the mid-weight 
ranges the required field lengths diverge, indicating that the accel-stop performance is the 
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driving factor in performance predictions, since the aircraft need markedly more runway 
to stop at the higher speed of VR. 
Table 2 Effect of Long Rotation Times 
on Certified Takeoff 
 
Table 2 illustrates the effects of a reduced rotation rate on field performance.  The 
lagging rotation time causes the VR speed to increase significantly.  The slow rotation 
would result in the aircraft achieving very sluggish climb performance as the pitch 
attitude is very slow to reach the ideal angle for best climb rate.  This causes the aircraft 
to accelerate well past V2 (under OEI thrust), however much more field length is used 
due to the shallow climb gradient (recall, horizonatal distance is still factored until the 
aircraft is over 35ft AGL).  Interestingly, due to all of the increased V speeds across the 
board, the balanced field V1 and VR speeds are in very close proximity, as are the field 
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length requirements.  The elevated V2 speeds have dragged the decision and rotation 
speeds up significantly resulting in greater field length requirements.  
Table 3 Effect of Slow Acting Pilot on 
RTO Initiation on Certified Takeoff 
 
Table 3 demonstrates the effects of slow pilot reaction times to an engine failure.  
Recall, that these are the times added to the field length distances and V speeds as 
annotated in 14 C.F.R. § 25.10944 and AC 25-7C. 11  The light weight cases show the 
V1 and VR speeds in very close proximity.  This is to be expected, since the delayed 
reaction times allow the aircraft to accelerate for a longer time period.  By the time the 
pilot reacts to the engine failure, the aircraft has already accelerated to VR.  The field 
length requirements are much higher over baseline at the reduced weights as well, due to 
the pilots delay in applying the braking action in an RTO situation.  However, at the 
heavier weights the balanced field V1 and VR speeds and distances diverge.  This is 
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likely due to the increased distance covered at the higher VR speed before braking is 
applied, over the balanced field V1 speed.  Interestingly, the balanced field length 
requirements and the V1 speed do no diverge much from the baseline performance, 
indicating at higher weights, lagging pilot’s reactions aren’t highly detrimental to the 
field performance.   
VII. Overview of Field Work 
In order to evaluate commercial aircraft operations in real world settings, multiple 
avenues are explored to obtain relevant data.  This work was previously carried out in 
AIAA-2017-3276, which was presented at the Aviation Technology, Integration and 
Operations conference (ATIO), as a predecessor to this thesis (Wood, Takahashi, & Bays, 
2017). 
One source of information pertaining to procedures is to query the line pilots 
flying aircraft in the field.  This gives insight into what is actually happening in the 
cockpit across a sizable cross section of the piloting community and can illuminate the 
procedures, or deviation from, commonly used during takeoff.  The data collected and 
statements from pilots are subject to personal interpretation of procedures and can be 
erroneous from the techniques that are actually used.   
Another source, and potentially highest resolution data regarding procedural 
impact, may be found through in-cockpit observations.  Observations of actual 
procedures used during the takeoff run illuminate the day-to-day operations of 
commercial aircraft.  This is limiting in that the observable takeoff runs are restricted to 
the operators that would agree to allow observers into the cockpit and how many flights 
an observer could physically sit in throughout an acquisition period.  Because engine 
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failure is a rare occurrence, the in-cockpit observations of emergency procedures will be 
restricted to observations of student pilots operating a flight simulator. 
The data gathered in these observations have enough overlap to build an 
informative picture into the actual state of field performance in the commercial industry 
today. 
Execution of the observations was done through a two-part process; a survey was 
conducted to gauge standard procedures used among commercial pilots and in cockpit 
observations conducted in a FAA certified level 6 simulator with commercial student 
pilots.  
A. Survey 
An initial examination of the issues surrounding piloting techniques through an 
anonymous survey was carried out.  The survey was posted on airliners.net and 
airlinepilotforums.com on October 6, 2016 and remained open to responses for seven 
days.  Ninety-three pilots responded, with the vast majority being ATP or commercially 
certified aviators and are currently working as line pilots.  Screening questions were 
asked to determine if the responding pilots were engaged in relevant operations.  This 
filtered out a few respondents, as they flew aircraft outside the scope of this research or 
did not operate aircraft as a commercial operator.  
The survey was not restricted to aircrew in the United States and was available to 
foreign carriers, however, the survey was conducted in English and is considered 
applicable to this topic as commercial operations, and the government regulations that 
they operate under, in other first world, English speaking, countries are predominantly 
similar in scope to that of the U.S.   
42 
Special precautions were taken to ensure anonymity of the responding pilots.  No 
names or other identifying characteristics, of persons or organizations were captured.  
This was to promote honest and casual responses by participating aircrew without fear of 
retaliation or repercussions.  Respondents were advised that their identity would be 
protected and that participation in the survey was consent to use data for analysis 
purposes.  The survey and recruitment materials were cleared through the Arizona State 
University Industrial Review Board to ensure all federal privacy regulations were 
adhered to. 
The survey consisted of a short multiple-choice questionnaire for aircrew to 
respond with the techniques and procedure they use during takeoff.  Initial evaluation 
questions were asked to ensure responding aircrew was in fact certified in the operation 
of commercial aircraft and flew in regular commercial operations.  These pilots were 
asked to identify the aircraft they were currently certified to fly in order to ensure the 
aircraft are multi-engine turbine transport category.  Finally, the aircrews were asked to 
identify the procedures they commonly used for calculating field length requirements and 
V-speeds, as well as their opinion on how well the aircraft met the predicted values. 
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Very high percentages of aircrew responding to the survey were commercially 
rated pilots or above, and most flew for commercial “for hire” air carriers.  All 
responding aircrew routinely flew commercial aircraft from small regional operators up 
to large intercontinental turbofan airliners.  All of these aircraft fall within the scope of 
this thesis, therefore the survey is considered relevant and the information gained to be 
usable.   
The respondents covered an almost equal cross section of the regional and 
standard carrier aircraft with 92% of pilots holding Airline Transport Pilot certifications 
or higher, with a large percentage of these aircrews having over 2000 total flight hours.  
 
Figure 4 Respondent aircraft type 
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Examining Figure 5, which illustrates common practices for obtaining aircraft 
weight information and V-speeds for the takeoff run, the majority of pilots are given the 
information by dispatch.  However, a significant cross section of the operators obtain this 
critical information in cockpit through the use of hardcopy reference material (TOLD 
cards, QRH, etc.) or through the use of third party software on a laptop or other 
“electronic flight bag solutions”.  With this method, weights are entered into the software 
and takeoff speeds are given as an output.  While this shows a majority of commercial 
operators use methods consistent to their respective dispatch centers, nearly half of the 
other aircrews use differing methods, with 33% of the respondents using third party 
performance software.   
 
Figure 5 Common practice for obtaining 
dispatch weight and V-speeds 
45 
 
Figure 6 shows common practices for pitching rates during rotation on takeoff.  
Slightly more than half of reporting aircrews use a defined pitch rate as set forth by the 
AFM, whereas the remainder chooses pitch rate procedures completely arbitrarily.  Some 
of these pilots are following prompts from a flight director; however, this generally does 
not give pitching rates, just a target attitude.  Strikingly, a large percentage of reporting 
pilots do not follow any defined pitch rate standard, which can lead to detectable 
variability in the pitch rate timing.  More alarmingly was the use of flight director for 
rotation rate cues.  Examination of a Boeing 737-3/4/500 training manual states, “Do not 
follow flight director commands until after liftoff,” and “The flight director pitch 
command is not used for rotation” (Boeing, Flight Crew Training Manual: 737 Classic).  
While following flight director cues is common, the explicit documentation directing 
aircrews to ignore the flight director, in this example, leads to concern that the aircrews 
are not familiar with the procedures published in the AFM.  Rotation rate was one of the 
 
Figure 6 Common practice for pitch rates 
during takeoff 
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strongest contributors to increased takeoff distance in the numerical simulation 
previously discussed.   
 
Figure 7 shows common practices for pitch attitude targets during the takeoff run.  
The majority of pilots use a target pitch angle with reference to the artificial horizon, 
while about a quarter of the respondents use an angle of attack indicator or flight director 
for pitch angle information.  This is likely due to the large number of less sophisticated 
aircraft in operation that are lacking high fidelity feedback on critical flight information.  
More interesting is that nearly a quarter of the respondents initiate takeoff without any 
pitch target for rotation.  This begins to illustrate that there exists a significant population 
of currently operating aircrews out there that use procedures lacking in standardization.   
 
 
Figure 7 Common practice for pitch attitude 
during takeoff 
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 Figure 8 shows common practices for pitch rate procedures for One Engine 
Inoperative takeoff scenarios.  Interestingly the majority of reporting pilots state that they 
actually use a slower pitch rate in the event of an engine failure during takeoff past 
decision speed.  This is significant in that not only is the aircraft’s acceleration reduced, 
requiring more runway to accelerate to rotation speed, but the reduced pitch rate also 
increases takeoff distances.  It is safe to assume manufactures and operations account for 
the reduced acceleration effects, however, the variability in pitch rates leads to significant 
divergence in the actual runway used in comparison to the predicted distances.  These 
certainly beg the question, “are a majority of pilots ignoring OEI takeoff procedures, or 
are there no standardized procedure in place to train pilots to and they are left to guess the 
appropriate actions?” 
 
Figure 8 Common practices for OEI pitch 
rate during takeoff 
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Figure 9 and 10 show the perception among the commercial piloting community 
on how well aircraft performance aligns with the predictions set forth in the AFM’s and 
by dispatch.  The common perception is that aircraft commonly meet the field 
performance targets in runway length and climb out after liftoff.  A significant fraction of 
pilots state that the aircraft diverges from the officially supplied performance estimate 
(given through the AFM, or by other dispatch or performance software).  While some 
report better performance than predicted, a noticeable portion of reporting pilots (17%) 
state the aircraft perform worse than expected.  This feedback is concerning in that if the 
aircraft were pushed to the limit of its capabilities during the takeoff run, it would surely 
overrun the runway, despite the predicted field length requirements falling within the 
runaway being used.   
 
  
 
Figure 9  Perception on runway usage 
compared to predicted field length 
requirements. 
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Evaluation of the survey results reveals clear procedural differences among 
commercial aircraft operators during the takeoff regime.  Without procedural 
standardization across the entire industry, this is to be expected.  Non-standard 
procedures from one air carrier to another can result in a particular airframe having two 
different field requirement predictions.  While some operators seem to show more 
sophisticated field performance prediction capability, a significant cross section of the 
industry operates with rudimentary or non-existent take off procedures.   
Of further interest is the reported deviation in aircraft performance to the 
predicted values.  Surely no one would complain about an aircraft that performs better 
than expected, however, this raises concern that an aircrew wouldn’t be able to take full 
advantage of an airframe’s full field performance potential which restricts operations to a 
field that is longer than the aircraft would need.  Conversely, the non-insignificant 
 
Figure 10 Perception of initial climb out to 
predicted climb performance  
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reporting of aircraft that actually perform worse than the prediction bears consequences 
even more dire.   
These operational inconsistencies brought to light from this survey directly align 
with previous research conducted on procedural effects on field length requirements.  
Some comments volunteered by responding pilots seem to show an awareness for the 
procedural inconsistencies and ambiguity in calculating field length requirements.  One 
respondent illuminated this with a very succinct and direct statement by saying, “Measure 
with a micrometer, Mark with a grease pencil, Cut with an axe.  That about sums up the 
way aircraft performance works.”  
 One 2000+ hour CRJ pilot is quoted saying, “our performance data really doesn't 
inform us of items such as CFL or expected rates of climb.  It is designed to meet the 
regulatory requirements for runway performance and obstacle clearance, but beyond that 
we don't get any more useful information.”  In agreement, the CRJ-200 quick-reference-
handbook, gives cue-speeds (V1, VR, V2) in table form for various weights, airfield 
altitudes and temperatures ([CRJ], Quick Reference Handbook, 2012).  Nowhere, does it 
give a predicted runway length.  
Another interesting pilot response, in light of the student pilot observations; A 
2000+ hour CRJ and B737 pilot wrote, “Company dispatch software governs aircraft 
performance.  If it provides numbers for a given runway and aircraft configuration, it is 
legal.”  The pilot continues, stating that the survey, “fail[s] to understand performance 
calculations in a [Part] 121 environment.”  In addition, “all I worry about is flying the 
airplane according to company profile and rotating at the proper point in time.”  He 
insists, “As long as I safely meet Part 25 climb requirements that is all that matters.”   
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While this pilot appears very firm in his opinion, it begs the question, is 
regulatory compliance all that matters, even if you end up flying into the side of a 
mountain? 
This survey reveals that dispatch and pilots alike may remain blissfully unaware 
of scheduled aircraft performance.  
The more detailed CRJ-200 aircraft flight manual appears to be set up entirely for 
dispatch to determine the maximum permissible dispatch weight for a given airport 
runway ([CRJ], 2012).  There was no direct or in-direct method to “chase the charts” to 
determine what the predicted take-off AEO distance should be for any given dispatch 
scenario. 
B. Student Pilot Observations 
The survey reported inconsistencies in the procedures used by pilots in normal 
take-off and during emergencies.  Operational procedures do vary between airframes; 
however, procedures can vary between operators flying similar aircraft.  Being able to 
determine the training protocols used during initial and recurring pilot training, may help 
uncover pilot training material deficiencies.  These deficiencies lead to utilization of 
improper piloting techniques that could adversely affect field performance.  In order to 
remove the subjective interpretations of line pilots, in cockpit observations were 
conducted to determine commonly used procedures and piloting techniques. 
i. Observation Site 
The CRJ-200 flight simulator is located at Arizona State University Polytechnic 
campus.  This is a FAA certified Level 6 Flight Training Device (FTD) with high-
resolution projectors for external views and an exact replica of the CRJ-200 cockpit.  
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Flight control yokes have force feedback capability with stick pusher.  The instructor 
station has full control over all aircraft systems and the weather environment. 
Observations were conducted on the CRJ-200 training class, which is part of the 
professional flight program at ASU (AMT 490).  Twenty students were enrolled in the 
spring 2017 semester.  Student pilots taking part in this class have already attained 
commercial certification.  Several students actively work as Certified Flight Instructors 
(CFI's).   
ii. Observation Protocol 
Observations were conducted using a four-camera security recording station for 
video acquisition.  Student names or other identifying information was not recorded; no 
cockpit audio was captured either.  Observations are anonymized post-facto; overall 
trends were sought out – not pilot specific trends.  
Video capture of the broad cockpit was synchronized, with close-up views of the Primary 
Flight Display (PFD), the datalogger screen and external forward view.  The recoded data 
stream in the flight simulator computers was able to produce a datalog file, with outputs 
for selected data streams in continuously updating text format (e.g. airspeed, altitude, 
position on runway, angle-of-attack, power-lever settings, etc.).  
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Cockpit, PFD, and external view were primarily used for capturing pilot timings 
and procedures.  The datalogger was the main source for numerical data acquisition.   
iii. All-Engines-Operating Data Set 
Over the spring 2017 semester, 50 total all-engines-operating take-off attempts 
were captured.  Following the “Rule of 30,” enough data was recorded to provide a 
meaningful correlation of a normal distribution when using simple statistical metrics such 
as the mean and the standard deviation. 
All-engines-operating (AEO) take-off observations captured data from the 
beginning of the take-off roll, through rotation and up to 35ft.  Forty-two normal AEO 
take-offs resulted in usable data.  This provided adequate sampling power for a statistical 
analysis on pilot timings and other trends.  Pilot timings in rotation, speeds, and lift off 
pitch angles as well as the runway distance covered in ground, transition and air phases 
were captured.   
 
Figure 11 CRJ-200 observation video recording 
demonstrating the cockpit, PFD, datalogger and external 
views 
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Most AEO take-offs were performed from large "hub" airports with long 
runways.  The majority of flight operations took place out of KPHX (Sky Harbor 
International Airport), KCLE (Cleveland-Hopkins International Airport), and KIAD 
(Washington Dulles International Airport).  A few departures used KDCA (Ronald 
Reagan Washington/National Airport), with its shorter 7,169ft runway to emulate short 
field operations.  Flights were conducted at high altitude airports; in this case, operations 
were flown out of KSLC (Salt Lake City International Airport).  Smaller spoke airports 
were also used, such as KSBA (Santa Barbara Municipal Airport) and KPWM (Portland 
International Airport). 
These observations provided direct insight into the dynamics within the cockpit, 
as well as the relationship between pilots and dispatch. 
All observed take-off procedures were “legal,” in the sense that they were 
performed at a dispatch weight below AFM limits for a given runway.  
Many take-offs were made using an “assumed temperature” (FLEX) derate 
procedure; this is a common procedure for dispatch to authorize when aircraft fly out of 
long runways.  Normal operation requires that the aircrew set the engines to a 
predetermined maximum thrust “N1” RPM.  This limits the amount of fuel going to the 
engine resulting in a temperature within the “hot section” of the engine that can be 
withstood indefinitely, while producing less thrust than the engine is rated for.  The N1 
limit is tied to the external temperature, which results in a lower limit if the aircraft is in a 
hot environment.  If the engines are placed in a true full throttle condition, maximum 
possible thrust will be generated, however, the hot section will begin to overheat and 
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cause damage to the internals.  The maximum thrust setting is usually reserved for 
emergencies.   
Under an “assumed temperature” procedure, pilots can limit take-off thrust to a 
lower value by utilizing a given temperature that is actually much hotter that the actual 
OAT.  The assumed temperature limits the N1 to a much lower RPM than it would be.  
This has the effect of lowering the engine noise, often for noise abatement, and reducing 
wear and tear on the engine.  The cost is the reduced thrust causes the aircraft to require 
significantly more runway; hence, the assumed temperature is only performed on 
exceptionally long runways.   
If the pilots press the “TOGA” button on the throttles, the flight director will 
display a fixed pitch attitude target of 15° nose up and disengage presentation of heading 
cues.  In the event of an engine failure, pilots are manually responsible for advancing the 
throttle further to obtain true maximum thrust on the remaining good engine.   
When given an approved assumed temperature dispatch; pilots will then punch in 
the dispatch-provided temperature into the FMC, and set the cue-speeds for the flight 
director (V1, VR, and V2) following the quick-reference-handbook values for actual 
dispatch weight, actual airfield pressure altitude and the dispatch-provided assumed 
temperature for the airfield.  
In this data set, pilots followed assumed temperature derate procedures for many 
runways.  Yet the assumed temperature was in no way particularly customized to the 
specifics of a given dispatch.  For example, the training flights departing 
Washington/National (KDCA) Runway 1, dispatch would provide an assumed 
56 
temperature of 41oC.  For a CRJ-200, this allows for safe dispatch up to 53,000-lbm; 
actual dispatch weights were typically within a thousand pounds of 47,500-lbm. 
 
Figure 12 displays the wide range of observed distances for the total Takeoff 
Distance Required (to 35ft), the TODR.  The average TODR observed was 4,801ft, with 
a standard deviation of 838ft.  While typical dispatch weights varied only slightly (the 
lightest dispatch was at 34,000-lbm, the heaviest at 53,000-lbm).  The longest observed 
take-off distance was 7,576ft, for a flex-thrust departure from Cleveland/Hopkins 
(KCLE) Runway 24R at 47,700-lbm flying into a 20-knot headwind.  Because Runway 
24R has a declared distance TOGR=TODA=9,000ft., this was a safe, legal take-off.  No 
rolling starts were observed. 
 
 
Figure 12 CRJ-200 AEO takeoff distance to 35ft 
AGL (TODR). 
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Basic physics implies a strong correlation between aircraft weight and take-off 
distance, examining figure 13, no correlation is evident in the experimental dataset 
(R2~0.36 in an attempted linear fit).  Thus, these observations confirm that pilot practice 
including variations in engine thrust arising from the assumed temperature derate 
procedure, pitch-rate and adherence to the provided cue speeds have completely 
overwhelmed the inherent mechanics of the problem. 
 
 
 
 Figure 13 CRJ-200 AEO takeoff distance to 
35ft (TODR) vs dispatch weight 
R² = 0.3653
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Figure 14 CRJ-200 AEO rotation speed (VR) 
deviation 
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As evidenced in figure 14 (prior page) and figure 15, pilots do not particularly 
closely adhere to the flight manual provided rotation speed.  The plot includes deviation 
of airspeed from the rotation speed (VR), provided by dispatch, as entered into the flight 
management computer (selectable in 2 knot increments as limited by CRJ-200 software) 
against the observed airspeed at initiation of rotation.  These observations call out the 
indicated airspeed displayed on the PFD at the actual moment of rotation.  The actual 
rotation airspeed includes some time lag associated with latencies in the air data system, 
thus the true indicated airspeed may be several knots faster.  It was discovered that the 
majority of pilots initiated within a few knots of VR (68% of pilots rotate within 2.4 
knots of the official speed; the median pilot rotated 1 knot above VR).  Some skew is 
present in the data set towards delayed rotation with some pilots rotating five or more 
knots late.  Pilot latency is further increased because standard cockpit procedure has the 
pilot-monitoring (PM) calling out the VR, while the pilot flying (PF) actually controls the 
aircraft. 
 
 
 
Figure 15 CRJ-200 AEO rotation speed (VR) 
observed vs scheduled correlation 
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Figure 16 shows the actual pitch rate (degrees of attitude per second) achieved by 
pilots during initial take-off rotation.  No identifiable distribution is evident in this 
dataset; although the median pitch rate observed was 2.6o/deg.  A large number of low 
pitch rates arose from a situation where the nosewheel begins to lift prior to a serious, 
pilot initiated rotation maneuver.  It is suspected that significant horizontal stabilizer trim 
inputs have the effect of “pre-rotating” the aircraft as it accelerates down the runway.  A 
large trim input would begin to pitch the aircraft without any input from the pilot.  
Coupled with the typical flap eight-takeoff setting and ground incidence from the landing 
gear, the aircraft is already generating ~80% of its weight in aerodynamic lift.  This 
contributes to a remarkable small amount of pitch input required from the pilot resulting 
in considerably short rotation times. 
It was discovered some dispatch cases required more effort to  rotate than others.  
It is  speculated that a combination of CG and stabilizer trim setting being the root cause 
for this dispersion. 
 
Figure 16 CRJ-200 AEO pitch rate 
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The peculiar, non-normal distribution also implied a lack of uniformity in pitch 
rate procedures.  Rotation execution appears to be haphazard with no standardization in 
training. 
Interestingly,  the actual aircraft attitude necessary for lift-off is fairly low. The 
median lift-of attitude was 5o with a standard deviation of +/- 0.5o.   
The rotation pitch rate also influences the air-phase distance as well as the speed 
that the aircraft attains at 35ft AGL.  While engineers select a VR speed so that an aircraft 
with one-engine-inoperative will just attain the V2 speed at the 35ft point, aircraft with 
all engines operating will typically accelerate past V2. 
 
In Figure 17, the wide range of ground roll consumed during take-off rotation is 
evident.  The median ground-roll during rotation was 480ft, but outliers exist up to 
1,443ft of runway consumed.  The lack of anything resembling a normal distribution 
reflects upon the haphazard nature behind pilot rotation. 
 
Figure 17 CRJ-200 AEO runway distance 
covered during rotation 
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Turning to Figure 18, which plots observed take-off ground roll TOGR against 
TODR, considerable scatter is shown in the total take-off distances, reflecting variance in 
both ground and air-phase procedure.  The large observed variation in rotation rates 
exacerbates the scatter.  The average air-phase distance was 535ft, but with a standard 
deviation of 100ft and a worst-case outlier with a 954ft air phase. 
Worthy of note is the number of cases where aircraft used almost the entire 
runway (9,000+ft) under AEO conditions.  Given that dispatch schedules V1 close to VR, 
it casts doubt on whether a successful a rejected-take-off (RTO) could be executed near 
the decision speed. 
 
Figure 18 CRJ-200 AEO TODR/TOGR 
correlation 
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In figure 19, the pitch angle attained as the aircraft achieves 35ft above-ground-
level is shown.  In contrast, this data set presents much closer to a normal distribution 
than the previously examined data.  The median pitch angle is 10o with a standard 
deviation of +/- 1.4o.   
This wide variation in pitch angle results in take-off with widely varying load 
factor.  Pulling 1.5-gees during initial climb out markedly increases induced drag, 
reducing the available thrust for acceleration.  This is reflected in the second-segment 
climb speed that is attained at the screen height.  
 
Figure 19 CRJ-200 AEO pitch angle at 35ft AGL 
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In AEO scenarios, pilots routinely overshoot the OEI V2 speed as expected.  
While no aircrews fell short of V2, the variance in over speed is quite wide as evidenced 
by figure 20.  The mean observed over speed for V2 is 11-knots with a standard deviation 
of +/- 5.7-knots.  Examining figure 21, a wide variance in V2 is shown.  While the 
handbook indicates a desired all-engines-operating second-segment climb speed of 
V2+10 knots, tremendous scatter is evident; a forced linear fit results in R2~0.38.   
 
 
Figure 20 CRJ-200 AEO obstacle clearance speed 
(V2) deviation from scheduled 
 
Figure 21 CRJ-200 AEO obstacle clearance speed 
(V2) observed vs. scheduled correlation 
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iv. Accelerate-Stop Data Set  
Observations also included 23 rejected take-off (RTO) cases with an accelerate-
stop maneuver.  Because most rejected take-offs involve a decision to abort that is made 
considerably below the formal decision speed, V1, analysis of distance information is not 
useful. 
 
As evidenced by figure 22, the majority of pilots have quick reaction times, but as 
usual, there were outliers.  Recalling that the observations are on training flights, pilots 
were often cued by the instructor before dispatch that an emergency might arise.  
Standard procedure during takeoff has the pilot monitoring (PM) operating 
throttles during the take-off run, while the pilot flying (PF) controls the aircraft.  If either 
pilot says, “Abort!” the PM retards throttles and PF operates brakes.  On the CRJ-200, 
lift-dump/aerodynamic braking is deployed automatically upon throttle retard (no pilot 
intervention to deploy).  For almost all observed cases, pilots also employed reverse 
thrust to help with RTO deceleration, even in the case of an engine failure.  The average 
  
Figure 22 CRJ-200 RTO reaction time 
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reaction time was 2.7-seconds, with a median reaction time of 1.9-seconds, a low of 0.2 
seconds and a high of 8.6-seconds with a standard deviation of 2.2-seconds.   
Recall that 14 C.F.R. § 25.109 requires engineers to include a distance safety margin 
“equivalent to 2 seconds at the V1 [speed] for take-off from a dry runway” (Accelerate-
Stop Distance, 1998).  While the median reaction time was ~2 seconds, a considerable 
number of pilots exhibited sufficient inattention.  This regulation might not really reflect 
the reaction time for pilots with “average skill.” 
Accelerate-stop distances displayed lots of variability due to differing abort 
initiation speeds, thrust reverser deploy strategies and braking effort.  In practice, a RTO 
from high speed to a full stop was uncommon.  Most crews simply slowed their aircraft 
down, and left the runway using a high-speed turnoff making determining runway use 
difficult.   
v. OEI Accelerate-Go Data Set 
Continued takeoffs with engine failures rarely occurred during observations, as 
such only five engine failures at or above V1 were captured.  Due to the small sample 
size, drawing definitive statistics is not possible, but several anecdotes can be shared that 
cause concern. 
In all observed OEI cases, the aircrews were able to rotate at VR with adequate 
runway to spare.  Interestingly, the speeds entered into the FMS from the speed cards 
place V1 within 2-3 knots of VR.  As previously discussed, an engine failure below V1 
initiates a rejected-take-off procedure, whereas failure above V1 commits the aircraft to 
flight.  With the close proximity of V1 and VR in the CRJ-200 dispatch solutions, the 
decision speed is essentially the rotation speed (V1=VR).  Since the instructor can only 
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fail the engine at or after V1, to ensure the aircrew continues the take-off, achieving VR 
is assured.   
In most cases, the crew was able to pitch the aircraft to achieve V2 at 35ft AGL. 
In one case, the aircraft was unable to reach V2.  This flight was departing KRIC 
(Richmond International Airport) on Runway 2, with 6,600ft usable.  The aircraft 
dispatched at a 48,000-lbm take-off weight with V1 set at 140 KIAS, VR set at 144 and 
V2 set at 150-KIAS.  The crew used an assumed temperature (FLEX) throttle setting for 
take-off PLA=~62%.  The aircraft reached V1 at 4,400ft downwind at which an engine 
failure occurred.  The aircraft immediately reached VR and rotated through 9° pitch 
attitude; VLOF occurred at 145 KIAS.  The aircraft reached 35ft AGL at 147 KIAS.  The 
aircrew continued to pitch the aircraft to 13° nose up; this caused airspeed to bleed off.  
By approximately 300ft AGL, the airspeed had sagged down to 140 KIAS, 4 KIAS below 
VR and 10 KIAS below the scheduled V2 speed.  The airspeed drifted up a few knots as 
the aircraft climbed through 600ft AGL, although still under VR, at which point the 
autopilot was activated.  The automated flight controls leveled the aircraft off and 
accelerated it back to V2 before resuming second-segment climb to flap retraction 
altitude.   
Comparable to this aircrew, similar trends across the other OEI observations were 
observed.  Other aircrews were able to obtain V2 at the 35ft screen height, although they 
too pitched the aircraft to a point where the airspeed began to drop off.  These pitch 
angles are appropriate in an AEO case, but too steep in an OEI scenario.  In each case, 
the aircraft was able to climb to 400ft AGL, but the resulting airspeed fell significantly 
below V2; often below VR!  Only one case was observed where the flight crew was able 
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to maintain a stabilized V2 throughout OEI second-segment-climb.  Recall that the 
aircraft is required to maintain V2 until at least an altitude of 400ft (Takeoff Path, 2007).   
It is suspected that lack of strict procedural adherence to the V-speeds in an OEI 
scenario stems from confusion in the cockpit, compounded by lack of strong 
understanding of climb performance and airspeed interaction.  Pilots become so 
engrossed with engaging the autopilot and systems operation that they lose basic 
airmanship; they forget to fly the aircraft.  Future observations will give a better idea as 
to how pilots react to emergencies and how mishandling the stricken aircraft affects field 
performance.   
VIII. Summary & Conclusion 
This thesis sought to determine the impact piloting procedure has on aircraft field 
performance.  The government attempts to regulate the industry as best it can in an effort 
to uphold air carriers to the highest standards of safety.  The regulatory framework has 
evolved throughout the years in response to disasters and tragedies to promote hyper-safe 
air travel.  Unfortunately, these standards are not entirely comprehensive in regards to 
field performance.   
Major takeoff and landing components are regulated; however, small details are 
over looked that can have profound effects on field performance.  Some aircraft 
manufacturers recognize the impacts from human factors in piloting, which is evidenced 
in these high-resolution flight manuals.  Conversely, AFMs from other manufacturers are 
severely lacking in any procedural information.  In order to predict critical field length 
with any accuracy, all factors must be evaluated for impact on performance.  Omitting 
certain variables, will produce erroneous field length requirement outcomes.   
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By employing a numerical simulation, individual piloting techniques and the 
associated effects on field performance were evaluated in detail.  Even small deviations 
in variables, such as rotation rate and reaction times, created significant growth in the 
runway required for takeoff.  Small delays in action can really add up distance when the 
aircraft is traveling 100+ knots down the runway.  This was brought to light in Table 2 
where leisurely rotation rates resulted in field length increases of over 1000ft in most 
cases.   
Further examination in piloting techniques through a survey of line pilots and 
observing advanced student pilots in the cockpit, preliminary conclusions as to what is 
happening in the cockpit in a commercially operated aircraft on a daily basis can be 
inferred.  
It appears that line pilots who routinely fly commercial aircraft are woefully 
unaware of the distances required for take-off.  The survey revealed many respondents 
did not routinely perform calculation of critical field length.  Many pilots are simply 
given the V-speeds required for take-off.  They proceed to fly without further question to 
the source or validity of the data. 
Large variations in pilot timings during rotation under normal AEO conditions 
were observed.  The lack of standardization in take-off procedure allows pilots to fly the 
aircraft as they choose.  Presentation of rotation targets on the PFD offer neither tail 
strike protection nor V-speed compliance without proper configuration.  Many flight 
manuals call this fact out; yet pilots admit to reliance on this target (or using even more 
ad-hoc procedures).  With such large variability in rotation timings, rates and pitch 
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targets, a non-stochastic prediction of field performance seems to offer a false sense of 
security. 
These “real-world” observations on piloting procedures reinforce the trends 
observed in the numerical simulation on piloting effects.  Data from the FTD 
observations shows a clear increase in runway usage from slow rotation during takeoff.  
This correlates with the outputs produced from the numerical simulation, where sluggish 
rotation rates caused massive increases in field length requirements.  Accounting for pilot 
timings in the transitory period between ground roll and flight phases is vital to 
accurately predicting critical field lengths; however, without clear and consistent piloting 
techniques, predicted field length requirements will be useless.  
Reaction times for initiation of RTO have large amounts of variance between 
pilots.  While many pilots were able to initiate RTO in a timely fashion, the fact that they 
fly in a simulator with clearly defined lesson objectives begs the question, of how many 
students knew the emergency was coming?  This foresight would certainly skew results 
to favor quick reaction times, yet many pilots still had lengthy reaction times.  It remains 
unclear if the pilots did not know whether to abort or not, or if the warning signals just 
take a long time to register.  Any direct assessment of accel-stop runway usage proves 
impossibly difficult with such a large variability in pilot reaction.   
Similar to rotation rates on the AEO takeoffs, the observed reaction times to 
warning signals calling for RTO initiation aligned with delayed reactions in the numerical 
simulation.  Postponed reactions in the CRJ-200 FTD that lead to delayed RTO 
commencement resulted in markedly longer stopping distances.  This increased runway 
usage was also shown in the numerical simulation output with delayed reaction times.  
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The numerical simulation only detailed RTO initiation at V1 resulting in much higher 
sensitivity to delays in braking commencement.  The observed pilots performed RTOs at 
various speeds; however, in the case of a high-speed abort in reality, the distances would 
grow considerably for unhurried reactions.  In any case, the reaction times observed in 
the FTD had significant variance that results in erratic stopping distances, making 
prediction problematic. 
Pilots also demonstrated difficulty adhering to climb speeds during an OEI take-
off during observations.  Whether due to the distraction of engine failure warnings or the 
frantic efforts to operate the aircraft systems, most student pilots had great difficulty in 
achieving a stabilized V2.  Some cases had the aircraft fly second segment beneath the 
VR speed; they are certainly flirting with stall.  While engine failures are uncommon in 
the field, the fact remains that they do happen and pilots should be able to adhere to V-
speeds to the benefit of everyone on board.   
Pilot timings can cause a significant increase in runway usage during take-off. 
These observations have shown that pilot timings vary significantly.  The deviation in 
these timings often results in much more runway usage than dispatch would expect or 
pilots are aware of.  Airports with extraordinarily long runways may be the redeemer for 
many of these pilots.   
Aircraft can only perform as well as the pilots that fly them.  
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APPENDIX A 
PILOT SURVEY 
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Piloting Techniques Survey 
I, Donald Wood, am a graduate student under the direction of Dr. Timothy Takahashi in 
the Ira A. Fulton College of Engineering at Arizona State University. 
I am inviting multi-turbine certified airmen that actively fly Part 23 and 25 certified 
aircraft in commercial transport operations to participate in a survey on common 
practices for calculating critical field length and procedures used during takeoff.  You 
have the right to not answer any question, and may stop participation at any time.   
Your participation in this survey is voluntary, and restricted to persons 18 and over.  If 
you choose not to participate or to withdraw from the survey at any time, there will be no 
penalty.  No compensation is offered for participation in this survey.   
Responses will be used to gauge attitude and common practices among the commercial 
piloting community for determining aircraft field performance.  The data will also be 
used as justification in conducting research into providing the commercial flight 
operations community with a more rigorous and thorough critical field length prediction 
tool. It is our goal to increase safety while improving aircraft performance through 
updated approved flight manuals and pilot training.  There are no foreseeable risks or 
discomforts to your participation.   
All responses are kept anonymous and any identifying data (deductive or otherwise) that 
is discovered will be destroyed.  There is no personal information asked or required, and 
IP addresses are not tracked.  The results of this study may be used in reports, 
presentations, or publications but your name will not be used.  Any data used for 
reporting purposes will be in aggregate form.  If you have questions, concerns, or 
complaints, talk to the research team at dlwood1@asu.edu or 
Timothy.Takahashi@asu.edu 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Social Behavioral IRB.  You may 
talk to them at (480) 965-6788 or by email at research.integrity@asu.edu if: 
• Your questions, concerns, or complaints are not being answered by the research team. 
• You cannot reach the research team. 
• You want to talk to someone besides the research team. 
• You have questions about your rights as a research participant. 
• You want to get information or provide input about this research. 
 
This survey should take no more than 5-10 minutes of your time to complete. 
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1. Please select you current pilot licensing. 
a. Private Pilot License (PPL) 
b. Commercial Pilot’s License 
c. Certified Flight Instructor (CFI) 
d. Airline Transport Pilot (ATP) 
2. Are you currently an actively flying pilot? 
a. Yes 
b. No 
3. Do you fly for a part 121 commercial transport airline? 
a. Yes  
b. No 
4. Please select the total  number of flight hours you have accumulated 
a. 0-100hrs 
b. 101-500hrs 
c. 501-1000hrs 
d. 1001-2000hrs 
e. 2000hrs+ 
5. When did you complete your last initial pilot training? 
a. 0-2yrs 
b. 3-6yrs 
c. 7-10yrs 
d. 11-15yrs 
e. 15+yrs 
 
6. When did you complete your last recurring pilot training? 
a. 0-2yrs 
b. 3-6yrs 
c. 7-10yrs 
d. 11-15yrs 
e. 15+yrs 
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The following questions all refer to the multi-engine turbine aircraft you typically fly 
(not to a Cessna 152 or other “private pilot” aircraft you might fly on weekends) 
7. How do you obtain dispatch weight and speed (V1, VR, V2) information? 
a. I perform the calculations myself using complex charts and tables found in 
the aircraft flight manual (AFM), or pilots operating handbook (POH) 
b. I am given take-off weights, maximum weights and speeds by a dispatch 
center 
c. I use TOLD cards, or a quick reference handbook (QRH) 
d. I do not calculate critical field lengths or takeoff speeds 
8. Are you given a specific attitude (degrees) to pitch to on rotation? 
a. Yes, I fly to a target pitch attitude based on an angle-of-attack instrument 
b. Yes, I fly to a target pitch attitude based on the artificial horizon 
c. No, but I know what pitch angle is likely to cause a tail strike 
d. No, I fly based on “feel” obtained through training 
9. How do you pitch the aircraft for takeoff rotation? 
a. I fly to attain a specific pitch rate as given in the aircraft flight manual 
(AFM) or pilots operating handbook (POH) for the specific aircraft type 
b. I fly to a consistent pitch rate obtained “by feel” through rigorous training 
for each specific aircraft type 
c. I fly differing pitch rates based upon experience depending upon the 
condition, but not specified in any formal document 
10. Do the takeoff procedures differ in one engine inoperative scenarios vs. all 
engines operating? 
a. No, I fly the same rotation procedure(pitch rate) for OEI as AEO 
b. Yes, I fly an OEI continued takeoff more carefully (slower pitch rate) than 
typical 
c. Yes, I fly an OEI continued takeoff more aggressively (faster pitch rate) 
than typical 
11. How do you feel your actual takeoff length compares to the published critical 
field length (CFL) given to you by dispatch (or obtained from the QRH or from 
chasing flight manual charts): 
a. Better than the book predicts (shorter distances); i.e. the “book” is 
pessimistic 
b. About the same as the book predicts; the “book” is accurate 
c. Worse than the book predicts (longer distances); i.e. the “book” is 
optimistic 
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12. Once airborne, how do you feel the aircraft performs? 
a. Better than the book predicts (higher climb rate); i.e. the “book” is 
pessimistic 
b. Is about the same as the book predicts; the “book” is accurate 
c. Worse than the book predicts (lower climb rate); i.e. the “book” is 
optimistic 
13. If you have any additional comments on aircraft field performance calculation 
procedures or piloting techniques for maximized field performance, please enter 
them below; 
 
